SSHRC Insight Grant awarded
A multi-year grant to study the effect of ride-sharing on local companies. With Turk Al-Sabah.
PhD
Research interests
47 updates since 2011
Grants, awards, publications, working papers, media coverage, and conferences I organize. Coverage that cites papers is listed under each item in Research.
All news
Comments featured in a Le Devoir article on Canada's Real Time Rail Payment System.
With Mian Wei. We examine how firm-level political risk affects open-market stock repurchases for U.S. firms..
A four-year grant as Principal Investigator.
With Paul Calluzzo and Simi Kedia. How the Say on Pay vote changed director elections — including ISS unbundling, information effects, and sentiment spillover when SOP support is low.
Comments featured in a national feature on how firms are learning to benefit from pay transparency.
With Sahar Shabani. When excess senior-executive employment creates or destroys shareholder value, and how governance and firm complexity shape the trade-off.
With Sahar Shabani. How big firms lead guidance withdrawal through board interlocks.
With Chander Shekhar. Why firms with different information environments disclose different things in their annual reports.
Third edition co-organized, bringing together scholars from Canada, the US, and beyond on governance, M&A, CSR, and banking versus fintech.
With Atefeh Maghzi. Why quasi-indexers may distance themselves from firms led by future-focused CEOs when long-term projects raise perceived information asymmetry.
Semifinalist for the Best Paper Award in Corporate Finance for "Corporate Gender Culture" (with Renée B. Adams and Pauline A. Grosjean).
Second edition co-organized.
How a vote-tabulation firm’s decision to withhold interim vote tallies reshapes shareholder proposals and market reactions.
With Renée B. Adams and André Gygax. Separating director human capital into knowledge, skill, ability, and experience — and why boards often underweight true skills.
With Mian Wei. What happens to dividends and repurchases once firms are required to disclose the ratio of CEO pay to median employee pay.
Inaugural edition co-organized.
Three-year funding (2023–2025) as Principal Investigator for research on corporate disclosure using textual analysis and machine learning.
With Yiming Qian and Frank Yu . Firm-specific analyst experience mitigates return anomalies tied to management discretion, primarily through monitoring rather than research alone.
Workshop initiated and organized through the Emerging Technologies sub-cluster.
Invited Professor Umit Gurun (University of Texas at Dallas) to present at the series.
With Renée B. Adams and Pauline A. Grosjean. Systematic measures of firms’ gender culture from Australian workplace reports — and which dimensions predict women’s leadership representation and firm performance.
Co-organized and spoke at an online forum with corporate director Michelle Savoy (NAV Canada) and senior advisor Tanya Gracie (Central 1 Credit Union). 48 registrations across sectors.
One of five founding members of an interdisciplinary research center on wealth, governance, and emerging challenges for Canadian organizations and regulators. Coordinator of the Emerging Technologies sub-cluster.
A sole-authored chapter on how board composition, audit quality, external monitors, and internal controls relate to fraud — and how firms rebuild governance after detection.
Evidence-based commentary on what the pandemic meant for markets and personal portfolios.
Co-organized the second of two editions of one of the most selective finance conferences internationally.
Summary of the Journal of Financial Economics paper for a practitioner and legal audience.
Co-organized the edition featuring Professor Oliver Hart as keynote speaker.
Findings from one of my research papers written for a general audience.
With Renée B. Adams and Patrick Verwijmeren. The framework has since been built on in the Journal of Financial Economics (2021) and the Review of Financial Studies (2022).
With Konrad Raff and Patrick Verwijmeren. Using the SEC’s 2009 reform as a quasi-natural experiment, the elimination of uninstructed broker voting did not increase average equity values.
Co-organized; co-sponsored by Tennis Australia.
Inaugural edition co-organized, bringing together scholars on financial institutions, regulatory policy, and corporate governance.
Shortlisted for the Best Paper Award in Corporate Finance for "Director Skill Sets."
With Jin S. Kim and Chander Shekhar. Why firms choose accelerated share repurchases over open-market programs, and how ASRs relate to takeover deterrence.
Best paper in the corporate finance track for "Director Skill Sets."
With Tommy Cooper, Michele Meoli, and Silvio Vismara. EU corporate-governance code adoptions reduced IPO underpricing on Member State-regulated markets relative to exchange-regulated markets.
With Lauren Cohen. Firms that use search firms to find directors pay CEOs more, are less likely to fire underperforming CEOs, and engage in value-destroying M&A.
With Patrick Verwijmeren. Firms with higher leverage pay higher wages — evidence that human-capital costs of bankruptcy are an important disadvantage of debt.
With Chi Chong Foo. Australian evidence that the undervaluation motive is a stronger signal than other stated repurchase reasons.
With Wei Fen Lim and Patrick Verwijmeren. Shareholder empowerment through director nominations appears to destroy rather than create shareholder value, with markets reacting negatively when the rule’s passage becomes more likely.
With Wei Fen Lim and Patrick Verwijmeren. More negative announcement effects for firms more likely to be targeted; the marginal shareholder did not perceive the proposed proxy-access rule as value increasing.
Intraday Istanbul Stock Exchange evidence on weekend and holiday effects, and how the length of a non-trading period shapes returns around it.
24 papers and chapters
Working papers first, then published articles and chapters. Open an item for the abstract, awards, media mentions, and links.
Working Papers
Abstract
This paper examines when senior executive employment creates or destroys shareholder value by studying vice president (VP) in U.S. public firms. Using comprehensive data from 2005–2024, we construct industry-adjusted measures of excess VP employment relative to economically comparable peers. We find that excess VP employment is associated with lower firm value on average, but this relation varies systematically with firm characteristic and market conditions. In particular, excess VP employment is positively associated with firm value in large firms and during periods of heightened economic stress. Governance analyses further show that weak monitoring amplifies the costs of excess VP employment, whereas stronger governance mitigates value destruction. These findings are robust to a range of identification and robustness tests, including matching-based approaches, instrumental variables, and alternative peer benchmarks. Overall, the evidence points to a trade-off between the benefits of additional senior executive capacity in complex environments and the agency-related costs of executive staffing.
Links
BibTeX
@techreport{akyolshabani2026vicepresidents,
title={{What Do All These Vice Presidents Do?} The Costs and Benefits of Senior Executive Employment},
author={Akyol, Ali C. and Shabani, Sahar},
year={2026},
type={Working paper}
}
Abstract
We examine how firm-level political risk affects open-market stock repurchases for U.S. firms. Using Hassan et al.’s (2019) text-based measure and novel monthly repurchase data from SEC filings, we document a robust positive association that emerges with a one-month lag after earnings calls. The effect concentrates in firms with weaker governance, supporting an agency rather than signaling interpretation. Results survive a battery of tests addressing selection and endogeneity concerns. Political risk also lowers the repurchase share of total payouts, indicating that dividends and repurchases play complementary roles under uncertainty.
BibTeX
@techreport{akyolwei2026politicalrisk,
title={Firm-Level Political Risk and Stock Repurchases},
author={Akyol, Ali C. and Wei, Mian},
year={2026},
type={Working paper},
doi={10.2139/ssrn.4954055}
}
Abstract
This paper examines how information flows through board interlocks in corporate networks, focusing on the asymmetric influence of larger firms on smaller connected firms. Board interlocks provide channels for firms to observe and respond to each other’s disclosure decisions, yet the role of firm size in moderating this influence remains understudied. We use the COVID-19 pandemic as a natural experiment, as the rare event of earnings guidance withdrawals surged due to heightened uncertainty and economic volatility, creating a unique setting to study disclosure behavior. Analyzing a sample of U.S. public firms, we find that smaller firms are significantly more likely to withdraw earnings guidance after larger, connected peers do especially when connected through experienced audit committee members. These findings reveal that information transmission via interlocks is asymmetric, driven by firm size and director expertise, and that such effects become more visible during periods of crisis. This research contributes to understanding how disclosure practices diffuse through corporate networks and highlights the strategic role of firm size in shaping voluntary disclosure decisions.
Links
BibTeX
@techreport{akyolshabani2026interlocks,
title={Interlocks in the Shadow: How Big Firms Lead Guidance Withdrawal},
author={Akyol, Ali C. and Shabani, Sahar},
year={2026},
type={Working paper}
}
Abstract
I examine the impact of a vote tabulation firm’s decision to withhold interim vote tally data from proposal sponsors. The results show a positive market reaction, particularly for firms using the tabulation firm. Shareholder support for proposals declined following the decision, suggesting weakened coordination and reduced likelihood of passing proposals. The market’s response suggests that investors do not uniformly view shareholder proposals as value-enhancing, instead perceiving limits on shareholder influence as stabilizing for firms. My findings also highlight the critical role of vote-tallying firms in corporate elections and provide evidence that vote-counting procedures, often seen as neutral, can materially impact shareholder rights and firm value.
Media mentions
BibTeX
@techreport{akyol2024intermediary,
title={Intermediary Power in Corporate Elections and the Value of Shareholder Proposals: A Quasi-Natural Experiment},
author={Akyol, Ali C.},
year={2026},
type={Working paper},
doi={10.2139/ssrn.4770592}
}
Abstract
We show that the Say on Pay (SOP) vote changed the nature of director elections. Shareholder support for directors is 0.7% higher when a SOP vote is on the ballot. This average masks sharp heterogeneity: support rises by about 1% when the SOP raises no major concerns and falls by 2.9% when SOP support is low. The average increase in director support, though not it’s variation with SOP support, is explained by ISS's unbundling policy, which lowers the likelihood of a negative director recommendation by 37% when the SOP is on the ballot. When the SOP raises no concerns, the attention it draws improves the information environment and the director vote becomes more informative: support discriminates among directors on observable effort and is more predictive of board turnover and of future outside directorships. When the SOP raises concerns, negative sentiment spills over indiscriminately, depressing support for all directors and even for routine management proposals, with no accompanying information content. Sharpened director incentives and cross-item sentiment spillover are two previously unrecognized consequences of the SOP vote for firm governance.
Links
BibTeX
@techreport{akyolcalluzzokedia2026sayonpay,
title={Paying Attention: Say on Pay and Director Elections},
author={Akyol, Ali C. and Calluzzo, Paul and Kedia, Simi},
year={2026},
type={Working paper}
}
Abstract
We investigate how firms respond to internal pay inequality, specifically focusing on CEO-employee pay ratios. Our analysis shows that after pay ratio disclosures are made public, companies with higher CEO pay ratios increase their dividend payouts to alleviate negative reactions from investors and the market. This connection between CEO pay ratios and dividend distributions remains consistent across different firm characteristics and alternative explanations. Our findings indicate that firms are aware of the potential drawbacks of high pay ratios for their shareholders and proactively seek to retain current investors or attract new ones by boosting their dividends.
BibTeX
@techreport{akyolwei2026payinequality,
title={Within-Firm Pay Inequality and Payout Policies},
author={Akyol, Ali C. and Wei, Mian},
year={2026},
type={Working paper},
doi={10.2139/ssrn.4464155}
}
Abstract
Future-focused CEOs are often associated with positive outcomes, such as fostering long-term competitive advantage. However, we argue that a comprehensive understanding of their role requires examining potential drawbacks, particularly in relation to quasi-indexers, a growing group of important institutional investors. Our study proposes that quasi-indexers may distance themselves from firms managed by future-focused CEOs due to a heightened perceptions of information asymmetry. This stems from the inherent uncertainty of long-term projects pursued by these CEOs, characterized by unavailable information and unpredictability. Quasi-indexers rely predominantly on publicly available information and thus cannot determine with clarity whether limited disclosures result from the nature of the CEOs’ investment strategies or deliberate withholding of information. Consequently, quasi-indexers perceive higher information asymmetry in firms led by future-focused CEOs. Conversely, quasi-indexers are more inclined to invest in firms managed by past- and present-focused CEOs, as these managers rely on historical and current information, which reduces perceptions of information asymmetry. Data from 65,512 firm-quarter observations between 2001 and 2016 supports the relationship between past- and future-focused CEOs and quasi-indexers. Our findings also show that the lower perception of information asymmetry strengthens the relationship between past-focused CEOs and quasi-indexers. This research contributes to upper echelons theory by identifying CEOs’ temporal focus as a critical cognitive factor influencing external stakeholder behavior. It also enriches behavioral strategy by linking managerial cognition to investor decision-making. Lastly, we offer practical insights for CEOs and investors to enhance transparency and foster stronger relationships.
Links
BibTeX
@techreport{akyolmaghzi2024futurefocused,
title={Future-Focused CEOs and Institutional Investors: The Tension of Information Asymmetry},
author={Akyol, Ali C. and Maghzi, Atefeh},
year={2025},
type={Working paper}
}
Abstract
This study addresses the multidimensionality of director human capital sets by separating them into knowledge, skill, general cognitive ability and experience (KSAE). We document that although typical boards cover a wide range of human capital, they lack scientific, sustainability and entrepreneurial KSAEs. While only a minority of KSAEs are associated with director selection from other boards, firms have a tendency to select directors who have similar knowledge and skills but not general cognitive abilities and experience. Such selection practices are suboptimal as firm performance suffers from the absence of skill and a prevalence of knowledge. Such selection practices are counter to shareholders’ interests because true skills are most important in addressing technological disruption and other businesses challenges firms are facing. Our results suggest there is a trade-off between boardroom chemistry and adaptation.
Links
BibTeX
@techreport{adamsakyolgygax2021boardroom,
title={In Search of Boardroom Chemistry},
author={Adams, Renée B. and Akyol, Ali C. and Gygax, André},
year={2025},
type={Working paper}
}
Abstract
We examine CEO language during final earnings calls before forced turnovers to identify speech patterns that precede dismissal and assess whether linguistic traits predict forced turnover. Our findings reveal that CEOs facing dismissal show distinct verbal behaviors, including increased use of first-person pronouns, analytical language, power-related words, and a present-focused orientation. In contrast, CEOs who retain their positions use more third-person pronouns, authentic language, affective words, and tentative speech. These patterns are consistent across various analytical methods like propensity score matching and difference-in-differences analyses. Notably, CFOs do not exhibit similar language changes, and new CEOs after forced turnovers adopt different communication styles compared to their predecessors. This study contributes to the literature on executive communication, showing how CEO language can signal impending dismissal, and offers new insights into corporate governance and leadership transitions.
BibTeX
@techreport{akyolshabani2025words,
title={Words Before Exit: CEO Linguistic Patterns and Forced Turnover Outcomes},
author={Akyol, Ali C. and Shabani, Sahar},
year={2025},
type={Working paper},
doi={10.2139/ssrn.5325614}
}
Abstract
We show workplace culture is gendered. We apply computational linguistic models to listed firms’ reports to an Australian gender-equality agency to construct the first systematic measures of ‘corporate gender culture’—firms’ practices pertaining to the treatment of women across seven dimensions, from recruitment and promotion to maternity leave and sexual harassment. Our measures reveal that firms treat women systematically differently from men, but also that gender differentiation varies across industry and firm characteristics. The cultural dimension that best predicts women’s representation in corporate leadership is also the one that best predicts firm performance, namely equality of training opportunities.
Awards
BibTeX
@techreport{adamsakyolgrosjean2021genderculture,
title={Corporate Gender Culture},
author={Adams, Renée B. and Akyol, Ali C. and Grosjean, Pauline A.},
year={2024},
type={Working paper},
doi={10.2139/ssrn.3880650}
}
Publications
International Journal of Managerial Finance, Volume 22, Issue 1, pp. 149-175
Abstract
The study compares disclosure characteristics in the MD&A and footnote sections of 10-K filings, which are subject to different regulatory treatment. It examines how disclosure length, content, and tone relate to firm performance while accounting for information demand and industry competition. Better-performing firms have shorter MD&A sections and footnotes, and the two sections exhibit broadly similar language and tone. Their disclosure characteristics are also related to future performance and stock returns.
BibTeX
@article{akyolshekhar2026information,
title={Information environment, proprietary costs and disclosure content in firm 10-K reports},
author={Akyol, Ali C. and Shekhar, Chander},
journal={International Journal of Managerial Finance},
volume={22},
number={1},
pages={149--175},
year={2026},
doi={10.1108/IJMF-12-2024-0683}
}
Journal of Banking and Finance, Volume 149, Article 106798
Abstract
We document that return anomalies related to management discretions are mitigated for firms followed by more experienced analysts. Nonetheless, only experience directly covering the firm matters while experience covering other firms is not associated with greater price efficiency. Focusing on the accrual anomaly, we then examine research and monitoring as possible channels through which experience mitigates mispricing. For firms followed by more experienced analysts, we find that forecast revisions and stock prices respond more positively to the accrual component of earnings. We further find that accrual quality is higher in firms followed by more experienced analysts, which holds after using both propensity score matching and exogenous events of brokerage closures and mergers to control for endogeneity. Collectively, our results are consistent with monitoring being the primary mechanism by which experienced analysts reduce accrual mispricing.
BibTeX
@article{akyolqianyu2023experienced,
title={How do experienced analysts improve price efficiency?},
author={Akyol, Ali C. and Qian, Yiming and Yu, Frank},
journal={Journal of Banking and Finance},
volume={149},
pages={106798},
year={2023},
doi={10.1016/j.jbankfin.2023.106798}
}
Corporate Fraud Exposed, Emerald Publishing, pp. 107-125
Abstract
This chapter reviews research on the relationship between corporate governance and fraud. It discusses how board composition and audit quality relate to fraud likelihood, how external monitors such as blockholders and regulators can constrain misconduct, and why effective internal controls are important for monitoring both senior managers and employees. It also reviews evidence that firms strengthen their governance structures after fraud is detected in an effort to restore reputation and trust.
Links
BibTeX
@incollection{akyol2020governancefraud,
title={Corporate Governance and Fraud},
author={Akyol, Ali C.},
booktitle={Corporate Fraud Exposed},
editor={Baker, H. Kent and Purda, Lynnette and Saadi, Samir},
pages={107--125},
publisher={Emerald Publishing},
year={2020},
doi={10.1108/978-1-78973-417-120201007}
}
Journal of Financial Economics, Volume 130, Issue 3, pp. 641-662
Abstract
Directors are not one-dimensional. We characterize their skill sets by exploiting Regulation S-K's 2009 requirement that U.S. firms must disclose the experience, qualifications, attributes, or skills that led the nominating committee to choose an individual as a director. We then examine how skills cluster on and across boards. Factor analysis indicates that the main dimension along which boards vary is in the diversity of skills of their directors. We find that firm performance increases when director skill sets exhibit more commonality.
Awards
Media mentions
BibTeX
@article{adamsakyolverwijmeren2018skills,
title={Director skill sets},
author={Adams, Renée B. and Akyol, Ali C. and Verwijmeren, Patrick},
journal={Journal of Financial Economics},
volume={130},
number={3},
pages={641--662},
year={2018},
doi={10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.04.010}
}
Finance Research Letters, Volume 21, pp. 34-39
Abstract
In 2009, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) reformed shareholder voting by eliminating uninstructed broker voting in director elections. We use this reform as a quasi-natural experiment to assess the value of shareholder empowerment. Using different control groups and various cross-sectional tests, we find that the reform did not increase average equity values.
BibTeX
@article{akyolraffverwijmeren2017broker,
title={The Elimination of Broker Voting in Director Elections},
author={Akyol, Ali C. and Raff, Konrad and Verwijmeren, Patrick},
journal={Finance Research Letters},
volume={21},
pages={34--39},
year={2017},
doi={10.1016/j.frl.2017.02.001}
}
Journal of Banking and Finance, Volume 45, pp. 43-58
Abstract
We use a sample of 3677 European IPOs during the period 1998–2012 to examine how the adoptions of corporate governance codes by Member States of the European Union (EU) have affected IPO underpricing on Member State-regulated markets, where issuers are subject to corporate governance rules instituted by Member States, relative to a control sample of IPOs on exchange-regulated markets, where issuers are exempt from Member State corporate governance codes. Using this control sample approach facilitated by the existence of second-tier, exchange-regulated markets in the EU, we find that, on average, IPO underpricing declined on Member State-regulated markets after Member States adopted corporate governance codes containing SOX-like provisions. We do not find a similar reduction in IPO underpricing on exchange-regulated markets. Our results are robust to alternative specifications, and our findings support the view that elevating corporate governance standards increases transparency and reduces information asymmetries that affect IPO valuations.
BibTeX
@article{akyolcoopermeolivismara2014ipo,
title={Do Regulatory Changes Affect IPO Underpricing?},
author={Akyol, Ali C. and Cooper, Tommy and Meoli, Michele and Vismara, Silvio},
journal={Journal of Banking and Finance},
volume={45},
pages={43--58},
year={2014},
doi={10.1016/j.jbankfin.2014.04.020}
}
International Review of Finance, Volume 14, Issue 3, pp. 319-343
Abstract
We examine the choice between accelerated share repurchase (ASR) and open market repurchase (OMR) as repurchase mechanisms between 2004 and 2007. For a sample of ASRs and OMRs that actually buy shares in the announcement quarter, we find that ASR firms have lower market-to-book ratios, less cash, but greater managerial entrenchment. Prior to repurchase, ASR firms are subject to significantly more takeover rumors than OMR firms are, and this, along with entrenchment and undervaluation, affects the choice to use ASRs. ASR firms experience positive average abnormal returns both before and after the announcement. Moreover, the latent takeover probability is significantly lower for both ASR and OMR firms (when compared with pre-announcement levels), but the reduction for ASR firms is more pronounced. Our results suggest that repurchases, and especially ASRs, indeed make a firm a less attractive prospect for takeover.
BibTeX
@article{akyolkimshekhar2014asr,
title={The Causes and Consequences of Accelerated Stock Repurchases},
author={Akyol, Ali C. and Kim, Jin S. and Shekhar, Chander},
journal={International Review of Finance},
volume={14},
number={3},
pages={319--343},
year={2014},
doi={10.1111/irfi.12035}
}
Journal of Financial Intermediation, Volume 22, Issue 3, pp. 464-481
Abstract
Because bankruptcy is costly for employees, theoretical studies argue that firms with higher leverage have to pay their employees higher wages. In this paper we empirically test this prediction. We find that firm leverage is positively related to the wages of employees, both in the United States and in the Netherlands. In the United States, the positive relation between wages and leverage is strongest in the 21st century, which is a period that also shows a positive relation between wages and unemployment rates. We conclude that the human capital costs of bankruptcy are an important disadvantage of debt.
Links
BibTeX
@article{akyolverwijmeren2013humancapital,
title={Human capital costs, firm leverage, and unemployment rates},
author={Akyol, Ali C. and Verwijmeren, Patrick},
journal={Journal of Financial Intermediation},
volume={22},
number={3},
pages={464--481},
year={2013},
doi={10.1016/j.jfi.2013.04.003}
}
International Review of Finance, Volume 13, Issue 1, pp. 1-37
Abstract
Using repurchase reasons provided by Australian companies for their stock repurchase programs, we ask if the market's response is different across repurchase motivations by examining actual daily share repurchases. We find that firms with the undervaluation motive experience a more positive stock price reaction when they report their repurchases to the market. We show that undervaluation motive firms repurchase fewer shares and have a lower program completion rate than other motives firms. During the 1-year period following the repurchases, undervaluation motive firms do better than their control sample firms whereas other motive firms do not perform better or worse than their control sample firms. Overall, our results suggest that the undervaluation motive is a stronger signal than other repurchase motives, and contrary to the predictions of the standard signaling theories, management statements carry some value for the market. We also present some evidence suggesting that a costly action may not be needed for a signal to be credible.
Links
BibTeX
@article{akyolfoo2013repurchase,
title={Share Repurchase Reasons and the Market Reaction to Actual Share Repurchases: Evidence from Australia},
author={Akyol, Ali C. and Foo, Chi Chong},
journal={International Review of Finance},
volume={13},
number={1},
pages={1--37},
year={2013},
doi={10.1111/j.1468-2443.2012.01159.x}
}
Advances in Financial Economics, Volume 16, pp. 43-77
Abstract
We show that companies that use search firms to find board members pay their CEOs significantly higher salaries and significantly higher total compensations. Further, companies with search firm-identified independent directors are significantly less likely to fire their CEOs following negative performance. In addition, companies with search firm-identified independent directors are significantly more likely to engage in mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and see abnormally low returns from this M&A activity. We instrument the endogenous choice of using an executive search through the varying geographic distance of companies to executive search firms. Using this instrumental variable framework, we show search firm-identified independent directors’ negative impact on firm performance, consistent with firm behavior and governance consequences we document.
BibTeX
@incollection{akyolcohen2013boardmembers,
title={Who Chooses Board Members?},
author={Akyol, Ali C. and Cohen, Lauren},
booktitle={Advances in Financial Economics},
volume={16},
pages={43--77},
publisher={Emerald Group Publishing Limited},
year={2013},
doi={10.1108/S1569-3732(2013)0000016002}
}
International Review of Finance, Volume 12, Issue 2, pp. 175-195
Abstract
We examine the wealth effects of the Security and Exchange Commission's (SEC) recent proxy access rule to facilitate director nominations by shareholders. We focus on how a firm's governance characteristics affect the market reaction to the rule. We find more negative announcement effects for firms with high probabilities of being targeted by shareholders. The announcement effects of the proxy access rule are positively related to the fraction of independent directors and the ratio of non-cash-based compensation, while announcement effects are inversely correlated with board size. Our findings suggest that the marginal shareholder does not perceive the proposed rule as value increasing.
BibTeX
@article{akyollimverwijmeren2012governance,
title={Governance Characteristics and the Market Reaction to the SEC's Proxy Access Rule},
author={Akyol, Ali C. and Lim, Wei Fen and Verwijmeren, Patrick},
journal={International Review of Finance},
volume={12},
number={2},
pages={175--195},
year={2012},
doi={10.1111/j.1468-2443.2011.01134.x}
}
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Volume 47, Issue 5, pp. 1029-1057
Applied Financial Economics, Volume 21, Issue 20, pp. 1549-1560
Abstract
I examine intraday stock returns in the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) around nontrading periods – weekends and holidays – by utilizing the exchange's structure of two trading sessions. I find that returns are generally more positive in the last session on Fridays and more negative in the first session on Mondays. The results also indicate that the weekend effect has disappeared in the ISE in recent years. I further find some evidence that there is a relationship between the length of a holiday nontrading period and returns around it. The longer a nontrading period is, the more positive the returns are in the morning session before the holiday and the less positive the returns are in the morning session after the holiday. My findings indicate the importance of the uncertainty imposed on stock returns by the length of a nontrading period.
BibTeX
@article{akyol2011nontrading,
title={Stock Returns around Non-Trading Periods: Evidence from an Emerging Market},
author={Akyol, Ali C.},
journal={Applied Financial Economics},
volume={21},
number={20},
pages={1549--1560},
year={2011},
doi={10.1080/09603107.2011.583214}
}
1 repositories
2 current, 23 graduated
Prospective students
PhD
I am available to supervise PhD students interested in pursuing research in my areas of expertise. If you are considering applying to work with me, please email me with a brief description of your research interests, your proposed topic or project, your CV, and your expected start date. Please note that my supervision capacity is limited, and I may suggest other potential supervisors if I am unable to take on additional students. For more information about the PhD program, including admission requirements and the application process, please visit Telfer's PhD program website.
MSc
I am available to supervise MSc students interested in completing a thesis or supervised project. If you are interested in working with me, please email me with the type of project you are considering, your expected dates, your CV, and a short list of topics or research areas of interest. Please note that my supervision capacity is limited, and I may suggest other potential supervisors if I am unable to take on additional students. For more information about the MSc program, including admission requirements and the application process, please visit Telfer's MSc program website.
Current students
PhD
PhD
University of Ottawa
MSc
University of Ottawa
Master of Commerce
University of Melbourne
Honours
University of Melbourne